The importance of biobanks has long been mooted, and multiple models of development and operation can be found as a result of many actors founding biobanks (from institutions starting disease-specific banks to governments starting national population biobanks). Many countries began developing biobanks in the absence of national policies to aid in that formation. Taiwan was one such country. Believing that the unique genetic makeup, distinctive lifestyles, and disease-causing factors of the Taiwanese people deserved study, Taiwan took steps to create Taiwan Biobank. This paper examines Taiwan Biobank's development and governance and focuses on two matters in particular which generated consternation during the development of Taiwan Biobank: the position adopted in relation to autonomy and ethnicity; and the approach toward transparency and internal governance. It concludes that Taiwan Biobank's conflict-ridden evolution represents a cautionary tale, an example of how not to develop a flagship resource. 
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Introduction
Shortly after the sequencing of the human genome, it was claimed that medical knowledge would be accelerated by the formation of 'biobanks', 1 here defined as new repositories of human tissue and generated data (genetic, phenotypic, lifestyle, environmental, and demographic) together with associated health data (occupation, lifestyle, diet, and medical), which repositories are collective, inclusive, prospective, and purposively indeterminate. It was felt that largescale longitudinal investigations into the interaction between common disease genes and environmental factors would be an optimal way to overcome common diseases and improve health. Therefore, many countries began developing national policies to aid in the formation of biobanks, or began developing biobanks in the absence of policies.
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Taiwan fell into the latter category. Believing that the unique genetic makeup, distinctive lifestyles, and disease-causing factors of the Taiwanese people deserved specific study,
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Taiwan took steps to create a national biobank. Proponents considered that, if the genes involved in common diseases could be defined and their risk quantified, new and improved treatments could be developed for Taiwan. Like many such banks, then, Taiwan Biobank's conception was an exercise in promise; a leap into the scientific and policy unknown supported by claims that risks would be offset by advances in health and by valuable collaborations and commercial returns, the latter of which was not always clearly conveyed to or understood by the public.
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This paper examines the establishment, development, and governance of Taiwan Biobank. First, it reviews the historical evolution of Taiwan Biobank.
Secondly, it examines two areas that generated significant controversy in this evolution, namely, positions adopted in relation to autonomy and ethnicity, and approaches in relation to transparency and internal governance. We propose that Taiwan Biobank's problematic evolution represents a cautionary tale, highlighting pitfalls to avoid in developing a national flagship resource.
The Development of Taiwan Biobank
Biotechnology in the Innovation Agenda (1990s-2005)
Like many countries, Taiwan adopted a policy of sci-tech innovation as a means of achieving sustainable development and international competitiveness. Health technology innovation and the establishment of biobank infrastructure resources featured heavily in this policy: • 1997: The Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) of the Executive Yuan held its first strategic review meeting on biotech policy, intending to promote national projects in genetic medicine and public health technology. Consequent projects included the National Genetic Medicine and the National Pharmacy and Biotech Projects.
• 1998: A second strategic review meeting resulted in the National Development Fund investing NT$20 billion to support the development of the biotech industry, the emphasis being on technology innovation projects, strategic alliances, and enterprise creation, including the investment by state-owned enterprises in the biotech industry.
• 1999: The Luchu Science Park was redeveloped with a Biomedicine District.
• 2001: Multiple regional 'Biotech Hallways' were created.
• 2002: The Academia Sinica established the Taiwan Han Chinese Cell and Genome Bank Project, which relied on data collected randomly through the computerised household registration system. 8
• 2004: The STAG argued that Taiwan should become an 'island of biomedical technology', and made a number of related recommendations.
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In response to the STAG, the Taiwanese Government launched the Biomedical The process leading up to (and beyond) this approval has been described as a 'development-first' approach with decisions being made almost exclusively by policy and science elites in closed processes.
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Moreover, these decisions were sometimes based on misinterpretations of the course adopted in other countries, and they persistently exemplified either simplistic understandings of risk, or a complete disregard for the associated risks.
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And while there was some effort to encourage scientific discourses, there was no effort to be transparent or to undertake any public engagement. Indeed, it has been argued that the complexity of the project together with the exclusivity of its development hindered both public understanding and public debate.
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In short, there was no interest in social supervision. Eventually, and primarily after the academic community began to complain, the Pilot Study met with a maelstrom of public criticism, exemplified by a commentary in the China Times which raised questions about consent, confidentiality, and benefit-sharing, and which demanded that the plans for Taiwan Biobank be made public.
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One of the issues that was persistently raised was that of ethnicity. Given the poor record of Aboriginal treatment, the fragility of human subject protections, the circulation of stories about failures to meet consent standards,
24
and the general absence of benefit-sharing models in Taiwan Protocol so that, in addition to the 200,000 participants originally envisioned, it could collect 100,000 patient samples and data from Taiwan's major hospitals, and it could focus on some specifically identified conditions (e.g., breast, lung, liver, colon, and rectum cancers, strokes, chronic kidney diseases, and Alzheimer's Disease). This rather tortured history highlights two matters which appear to have undermined the good governance of Taiwan Biobank in its early phases, and the general satisfaction with its development (though they cannot be said to have derailed its development). The first relates to its handling of ethnicity, including the special requirements that it imposes with respect to obtaining participant consent, and the second relates to the transparency (and accountability) around the undertaking's governance. These two matters are addressed in more detail in the sections that follow.
3 Mishandled matter 1: Foregrounding ethnicity and consent shortfalls
The problem with ethnicity
The specific identification of ethnic groups generated public controversy that was entirely predictable given the difficulties experienced by previous ethnicitybased genomic research, and the historic exploitation of Taiwanese Aboriginals. benefits to subject populations were dwarfed by the risks, which included undermining identity and long-held beliefs if it were discovered that they are from somewhere other than they believed. This could undermine claims for sovereignty, land, and other legal rights. 44 In response to pressure, including that from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ethical approval for the project was revoked in 2006.
The continued use of ethnic difference in recruitment, and the influence that race has had on (genomic) science and clinical medicine, largely to negative effect, has been widely lamented.
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A study of 11 leading journals reported that 'race' was a confusing, imprecise, and flawed concept, and that ethnicity was also ambiguous and sometimes just a synonym for race; it concluded that these concepts are research: that relating to disparities in access to healthcare.
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At base, while labelling and classifying are necessary social and scientific practices for ordering the world, the use of race and/or ethnicity for doing so is characterised by uncertainty because racial/ethnic categories are often negotiated (or imposed), contingent, and contextual.
The second factor dictating against use of ethnicity in Taiwan Although there have been no formal complaints, there have been controversies.
In the NSC-funded Kavalan Project, an interdisciplinary team of researchers sought to investigate migratory routes and origins of Taiwanese Kavalan.
Participants provided family and ethnic histories and blood samples. A tribal elder expressed concern about the collection of blood, which is viewed as sacred, so the researchers agreed to take saliva instead, obtaining 29 samples.
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But the Kavalan Development Association filed a formal request for the withdrawal of the project and a return of the samples, emphasising that the project should have been considered by the tribe as a whole. In April 2007, the samples were returned to the participants and they were disposed of in a public ceremony.
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As a result of all this, some Aboriginal communities -who often see themselves as oppressed minorities -have erected moratoriums on research within their territories. This includes: the identities of the sample collector and the biobank operator; reasons for recruitment; the sample collection methods; potential complications and risks associated with collection; type of health information that will be accessed and linked in the future; the expected purposes and duration of use of the samples; possible impacts of genetic information derived from samples on the participant and his/her relatives or an ethnic group; other reasonable risks or inconveniences; rights and benefits under the Act together with rights that are excluded by the Act; the mechanism in place to safeguard privacy and other rights; the operator's organizational structure and operating principles; relevant regulations governing biobanks; and anticipated commercial applications. 56 Although Article 9 empowers custodians to continue to store and use samples and data after a participant's death or incapacity, except as otherwise agreed. and strives for a more democratic and equitable science/society relationship, one that is deliberative, cooperative, and inclusive.
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All told, RRI calls for a comprehensive approach to research whereby all stakeholders can, at an early stage, develop insight into the social needs to which research ought to be directed, the range of options appropriate to a problem, and the consequences of research outcomes, and use this information to design protocols, products, and services.
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participatory practices at all stages of research and all levels of governance, from agenda setting, to design and implementation, to evaluation. This was obviously not done by Taiwan Biobank: it grounded its original protocol on contested identities; it refused to make public processes; it made findings of feasibility without making the targets it set; and it founded an EGC but amended its protocol on its own, and then quarrelled with other relevant regulators/overseers about its authority and procedures.
The law and current state-of-play
As noted above, confronted with ongoing social dissatisfaction -not necessarily with the bank per se, but with how it was being developed/managed -the 68 The erasure of the ethnicity foundation without comment or development of culture-sensitive recruitment procedures is also worrying, and not at all in keeping with the openness and discursiveness currently favoured (by policy approaches like RRI).
Article 21 HBMA 2010 states that any profits received by operators that are derived from commercial use of banked materials shall be given back to the specific population groups to which the respective participants belong. It is unclear whether Taiwan Biobank has a general benefit-sharing plan in place, or, more appropriately, any specific ones relating to Aboriginal participants. Article 5 HBMA 2010 states that any matters related to the application of data contained in the bank shall be drafted as a plan and submitted to the IRB for approval, after which it must be submitted to the Competent Authority who will invite legal experts, social workers, and other disinterested community members to review it before final approval. Presumably such a plan has been submitted to the MOHW, though this is not clear.
Any loss or theft of, or tampering with, samples, data, or information must be investigated immediately and reported to both the Competent Authority and to affected participants (Article 11). Articles 12-13 state that individuals engaged in collecting, processing, storing, or using samples and data shall maintain confidences, and the operator shall disclose rules on information management, which must be submitted to the Competent Authority after approval by the REC.
In support of this, the Human Biobank Information Security Regulations 2010 were adopted. The Regulations focus on training, outsourcing, security systems and linkage management, and access to systems, but it is argued that uncertainty remains around the security measures that might be adopted to prevent unauthorised access and leakage. 69 Article 18 stipulates that samples and data must be encoded, encrypted, delinked, or transformed so that the participant's identity cannot be determined. But again, the operation of this in the context of sharing across banks (which is now a central stream of activity for Taiwan
Biobank with the addition of the hospital samples) is uncertain. It would seem that the HBMA 2010 forbids such activity.
As demonstrated above, despite the comprehensive regulatory framework that has now been erected in relation to biobanks, there remains much uncertainty around the governance of Taiwan Biobank, not least in relation to data management. More importantly, there seems to be a persistent reluctance to engage in discourses with the public on these issues, and on governance matters more generally. And the laws that have been adopted have neglected to impose any sort of mandated participatory activities.
Conclusions: Taiwan Biobank -A cautionary tale
Taiwan Biobank is generally supported as a national project, but it has been criticised with regard to its operation to date. We suggest that the foregrounding of ethnicity and the absence of transparency have caused particular concerns that have not been well managed. If ethnicity was felt to be important, it needed to be more clearly delineated, more openly discussed, and more appropriately managed with respect to specific and bespoke recruitment mechanisms and governance processes. Also, given the general trend over the last 20 years with respect to science communication and the importance and value of healthy science-society partnerships, a much more open and participative approach to development, feasibility-testing, and stewardship was warranted.
With respect to recommendations, we argue that the evidence suggests that Taiwan Biobank must increase and improve its communication with stakeholders, including specified ethnic groups (whether as participants or as members of the broader public) if it is to maintain and finally secure legitimacy, and achieve some level of justifiable public trust. Taiwan Biobank not only needs concrete standards, but a means of making those standards understood. Related to this, the EGC should take steps to design ethically and legally sound recruitment practices that take into account cultural diversity (and the demands of legally protected groups). These practices should be clearly identified on the Taiwan Biobank website, and complied with by recruiters. Third, there is also significant work to be done with respect to privacy, and ensuring that Taiwan Biobank achieves its maximum utility through collaboration with researchers and other banks. Indeed, collaboration between Taiwan Biobank and other banks is just now starting, and this demands much more consistent and proactive engagement and rigorous public scrutiny than has exemplified to date. As part of this, Taiwan Biobank must come to grips with its multi-party supervisory situation (i.e., the demands of its oversight by the EGC, the IRB, and the MOHW must be determined and communicated so that errors are avoided and the process does not become too burdensome).
Our take-home message is that the development of Taiwan Biobank must be viewed as a cautionary tale, an example of how not to develop a national population genetic biobank. Its survival can be characterised as a product of the autocratic approach adopted by its proponents, and any adjustments toward openness or sensitivity might surely be a credit to the perseverance of the academic and civil society actors who have worked so hard to insinuate some level of scrutiny into the governance of the undertaking.
